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Abstract—Physical layer security offers an efficient means to decrease
the risk of confidential information leakage through wiretap links. In this
paper, we address the physical-layer security in a cooperative wireless
subnetwork that includes a source-destination pair and multiple relays,
exchanging information in the presence of a malevolent eavesdropper.
Specifically, the eavesdropper is active in the network and transmits
artificial noise (AN) with a multiple-antenna transmitter to confound
both the relays and the destination. We first analyse the secrecy capacity
of the direct source-to-destination transmission in terms of intercept
probability (IP) and secrecy outage probability (SOP). A decode-and-
forward incremental relaying (IR) protocol is then introduced to improve
reliability and security of communications in the presence of the active
eavesdropper. Within this context, and depending on the availability of
channel state information, three different schemes (one optimal and
two sub-optimal) are proposed to select a trusted relay to improve
the achievable secrecy rate. For each one of these schemes, and for
both selection and maximum ratio combining at the destination and
eavesdropper, we derive new and exact closed-form expressions for the
IP and SOP. Our analysis and simulation results demonstrate the superior
performance of the proposed IR-based selection schemes for secure
communication. They also confirm the existence of a floor phenomenon
for the SOP in the absence of AN.
Artificial noise, incremental relaying, network, physical-layer se-
curity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless communication is naturally susceptible to eavesdropping
due to the openness of the wireless medium and its broadcast nature.
Therefore, confidential information exchanged between legitimate
wireless nodes may easily be intercepted by unauthorized users. Due
to increasing demand for private communication over wireless chan-
nels, security issues in wireless networks have gained considerable
interest in recent years. Traditionally, security is implemented via
cryptographic protocols using public or private keys at upper layers
of the network stack. However, due to vulnerability in secret key
distribution and management in dense wireless networks, information
could be decrypted readily if the eavesdropper obtains the encryption
key.
A. Background
Using an information-theoretic approach, Shannon [1] and
Wyner [2], and shortly afterwards Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [3], have
argued that it is possible to achieve perfectly secure communications
without the use of cryptographic schemes if the channel of the
wiretap link is inferior in quality to the legitimate channel. In that
case, a confidential message can be encoded such that it can be
reliably decoded at its intended destination while revealing almost
no information to the eavesdropper. On this basis, physical (PHY)
layer security derived from the information-theoretic perspective
has attracted much attention recently as a promising approach for
protecting against eavesdropping, without significantly increasing
computational complexity [4–8]. The basic idea is to exploit the
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PHY characteristics of the wireless channels in order to mitigate
eavesdropping attacks. This line of work was extended in [9], where
the impact of feedback on a wiretap channel was examined in terms of
secrecy capacity, revealing that secure communication is still feasible,
even when the wiretap link is superior to the legitimate channel by
exploiting feedback information.
Taking advantage of multi-antenna systems to combat wireless
fading as well as increasing link reliability and secrecy capacity, there
has been a growing interest in extending the basic Gaussian wiretap
channel to multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) terminals [10].
The authors in [11] focused on the achievable secrecy capacity of
a multi-input single-output (MISO) configuration, while in [12] the
PHY layer security in MIMO relay networks was studied, revealing
a significant improvement in terms of secrecy rate through the use of
MIMO relays. The secrecy capacity of a broadcast MIMO wiretap
channel for an arbitrary number of transmit/receive antennas was
studied in [13], which showed that the perfect secrecy capacity is
equal to the difference in mutual information between the wiretap
and legitimate links. However, considering the hardware cost and size
limitations of multiple-antenna systems, cooperative relaying offers
a compelling alternative that enables single-antenna nodes to enjoy
the benefits of multiple-antenna systems while enhancing end-to-end
security and reliability of communications [14–16].
Depending on the role played by the relay in cooperative schemes,
three different generic scenarios can be identified. In the first scenario,
the relay nodes aim to assist the eavesdropper by decreasing the
secrecy rate [17]. In the second scenario, the relay acts as both
a collaborator and an eavesdropper [18]. In the third scenario,
which is the focus of this work, the relay collaborates with the
source to enhance security of the legitimate link [19]. Most of the
existing works on user cooperation for PHY layer security focus on
developing the secrecy rate from an information-theoretic viewpoint.
In [15], three different types of cooperative schemes are investi-
gated, namely: amplify-and-forward (AF), decode-and-forward (DF)
and cooperative-jamming (CJ). In particular, optimal relay weight
selection and power allocation strategies are proposed to enhance
the achievable secrecy rate for the second hop. The authors in [20]
study the four-node (i.e., source, destination, relay and eavesdropper)
secure communication system for different relay strategies, including
DF and noise-forwarding (NF). In [21], the four-node system is
further examined in the context of multi-carrier transmissions, where
the aim is to maximize the sum secrecy rate under a total system
power constraint. A novel relay selection strategy with jamming is
investigated in [22], where the aim is to improve security at the
destination under the assumption that the eavesdropper only overhears
the second hop.
Reference [23] analyzes secure relay and jammer selection for
the PHY-layer security improvement of a wireless network including
multiple intermediate nodes and eavesdroppers. In [4], the authors
propose a new multi-hop strategy where the relays add independent
randomization in each hop, which leads to significant secrecy im-
provement for the end-to-end transmission. The PHY layer security
is further explored in [24] for the two-way relay channels, where mul-
tiple two-way relays are employed to enhance the secrecy rate against
eavesdropping attacks. Other related works addressing the problem
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of PHY layer security in the presence of multiple intermediate nodes
or eavesdroppers include [25–31].
The aforementioned works are limited to cases where the eaves-
dropper node can only overhear the source’s message or that of
the relay but not both. The sub-network models invoked in these
and other studies are often afflicted by further restrictions, which
may limit their realm of application in practice. This includes the
following: consideration of a single eavesdropper equipped with
single antenna, as opposed to multiple antennas; legitimate network
sending artificial noise to degrade the wiretap link but not the
converse; and adoption of conventional cooperation protocols which
are not spectrally efficient.
B. Technical Contributions
Motivated by these observations, in this paper, we investigate
the effects of different relay selection schemes as well as different
combining techniques (under the Rayleigh fading model) on the PHY
layer security when the eavesdropper has access to both the source
and relay messages. Three relay selection schemes are employed
based on the availability of the channel state information (CSI),
namely: conventional selection, minimum selection, and optimal
selection. In conventional selection, the selected relay is the one that
results in the highest SNR at the destination. In minimum selection,
the selected relay is the one that results in the lowest SNR at the
eavesdropper. Finally, in optimal selection, the selected relay is the
one that maximizes the secrecy capacity.
For each one of these schemes, we study the performance of a DF-
incremental relaying (IR) protocol in the presence of eavesdropper
generated AN at both the relays and the destination. Cooperative
schemes based on IR outperforms those based on the traditional
retransmission of the source message [32]. In effect, they are amongst
the best performing schemes, as they preserve the channel resources
i.e., bandwidth and energy, while maintaining reliable communica-
tion.
By employing IR and due to the presence of direct links, the
destination and the eavesdropper each receive two different versions
of the source message. Consequently, diversity signal combining
techniques can be employed by these nodes, including: selection
combining (SC), which only selects the best signal out of all
replicas for further processing; and maximal ratio combining (MRC),
which coherently adds the signal replicas together for detection. For
convenience, henceforth, we shall use the nomenclature in Table 1
to refer to the various combinations of relay selection and signal
combining schemes. In this table each scheme is identified by a three-
letter label where the first letter stands for the DF strategy, the second
letter represents the type of the signal combining technique and the
third letter denotes the adopted relay selection scheme. In addition,
the scheme labeled “DT” denotes the conventional direct transmission
and finally, “All relays” means that all successful relays in decoding
cooperate simultaneously in the next phase without employing any
relay selection scheme.
While the literature on PHY layer security is abundant, the study of
security issue for cooperative IR networks affected by eavesdropper
generated AN has not been previously addressed. Specifically, our
work differs from the aforementioned studies in many aspects, its
main contributions being summarized as follows:
• We consider a cooperative wireless network with multiple relays
in the presence of an active eavesdropper and investigate com-
munication security from the perspective of information theory.
Unlike previous works, i.e. [33–38] where the source or relays
transmit AN together with information signals to deliberately
interfere with the eavesdropper’s received signal, both the relays
and the destination node in our model are confounded by AN
TABLE I
ADOPTED NOMENCLATURE FOR RELAY SELECTION SCHEMES UNDER
STUDY
Scheme Signal Combining Relay Selection
DMC MRC Conventional
DSC SC Conventional
DMM MRC Minimum
DSM SC Minimum
DMO MRC Optimal
DSO SC Optimal
DMA MRC All relays
DSA SC All relays
DT - No relay
originating from the eavesdropper node, which represents the
worst case scenario.
• Cooperative diversity with traditional fixed relaying leads to a
notable loss in the system capacity and efficiency because it
requires two time intervals for half-duplex transmission. In order
to prevent such a loss, we consider a novel IR strategy and inves-
tigate its performance in the context of secure communications.
• We present and investigate three different relay selection
schemes to enhance PHY layer security against eavesdropping
attack. In contrast to [39] which assumes conventional relay
selection and therefore only considers the relay-destination links,
we herein depending on the availability of CSI examine alter-
native selection schemes which take into account the quality of
both source-relay and relay-destination channels.
• We derive closed-form expressions for the intercept probabil-
ity (IP) and the secrecy outage probability (SOP) of all the
proposed schemes for cooperative IR networks, thereby fully
characterizing the associated security-reliability trade-off [40].
To provide further insight into system behavior, we also derive
corresponding asymptotic expressions for the SOP of each
scheme in the high SNR regime. These expressions facilitate
system design and help better understand the role played by
various internal parameters and their interaction.
C. Key Findings
Based on the analysis provided in this paper for the cooperative
IR wireless network in the presence of an active eavesdropper, our
key results include:
• When perfect CSI is available, the optimal relay selection
scheme provides the best security performance as compared to
the others. This follows because the optimal scheme takes into
account the quality of both the source-destination and relay-
destination links in its decision metric. In addition, the conven-
tional selection scheme always outperforms minimum selection,
which can be justified by invoking the concept of diversity order.
Indeed conventional selection provides a diversity gain for the
legitimate links when compared to minimum selection.
• The performance of SC is worse than that of MRC, typically
exhibiting a few dBs of power penalty. This is the price paid for
reduced complexity with SC, which allows a trade-off between
complexity and performance. SC has its own merits, which
explains its wide application in wireless communication in
general, as well as in works dealing with security (see e.g., [39]).
However, there is not a significant performance gap between the
two combining techniques when the minimum selection scheme
is employed.
• Only marginal performance improvements can be obtained by
increasing the number of relays for the DMM and DSM
schemes.
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Fig. 1. A wireless relay network consisting of one source (S), one destination
(D), and M relay nodes Rm, exchanging information in the presence of an
eavesdropper (E). The continuous and dashed black lines correspond to the
legitimate forward and backward links of the legitimate network, respectively,
while the dashed blue line illustrates the AN propagated by E.
• In the high SNR regime, all the proposed schemes achieve the
same diversity gain, while the difference in their performance
can be characterized by their achieved coding gain.
Mathematical Notations: The notation o (x) means an higher order
term in x, (i.e. lim
x→0
o(x)/x = 0); f(x) and F (x) respectively
denote the probability distribution function (PDF) and cumulative
distribution function (CDF) of random variable (RV) X; Γ (a, x)
is the upper incomplete gamma function while Φ(a, b;x) is the
confluent hypergeometric function of the second kind.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The adopted system
and channel models for cooperative relaying with active eavesdrop-
per are discussed in Section II. Sections III and IV present the
proposed IR-based schemes and their secrecy performance analysis,
respectively. Section V analyzes diversity order in the high SNR
regime. Section VI presents selected numerical simulation results to
support the theoretical study. Finally, Section VII contains concluding
remarks.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider the generic topology shown in Fig. 1 for secure communi-
cation in a cooperative wireless sub-network consisting of a source S,
a destination D, and a cluster of M DF relays Rm,m ∈ {1, ...,M}.
The purpose of the relays is to assist the data transmission be-
tween the source and the destination, in order to protect against
the overhearing attack of a malicious eavesdropper E. The source,
destination and relay nodes are characterized by the half-duplex
constraint and therefore cannot transmit and receive simultaneously,
while the eavesdropper node works in full duplex mode. Specifically,
the eavesdropper is active and utilizes a hybrid overhearing and AN
generating mechanism. Herein, “hybrid” means that during the data
exchange, the eavesdropper not only overhears to extract confidential
information but also propagates AN to degrade the PHY layer security
of the legitimate sub-network. To this end, the eavesdropper can use
multiple-antennas or collude with other attackers concealed nearby
to generate AN and confound the target receivers1.
Unlike traditional cooperation [41, 42], in the considered topol-
ogy only a subset of the M relays will be activated. Specifically,
we consider IR as a cooperation protocol which exploits an one-
bit feedback from the destination to the source in the form of
Acknowledgement/Negative-Acknowledgement (ACK/NACK) sig-
naling as shown in Fig. 1. In the proposed model, in the first phase,
S broadcasts its signal and all the relays Rm, m ∈ {1, ...,M},
attempt to decode it. Let F denote the random subset of relays that
can successfully decode the source message, referred to as the well-
informed relay subset (WIRS). Accordingly, the sample space of all
the possible WIRS outcomes is the power set P({R1, ..., RM}) with
cardinality 2M . In the sequel, it is convenient to individually represent
these subsets by Fn where the index n ∈ {1, 2, 3, ..., 2M}. Next,
1Even if the eavesdropper is equipped with a single antenna, by collaborat-
ing with helper nodes in its surrounding, it can control the generation of AN
that can still be malicious. For instance, multiple eavesdroppers can collude
to form an antenna array.
Fig. 2. A wireless relay network consisting of one source (S), one destination
(D), and exchanging information in the presence of an eavesdropper (E). The
continuous and dashed black lines correspond to the forward and backward
links of the legitimate network, while the dashed blue line shows the AN
propagated by E.
let R be a pre-determined rate which is contingent on the quality
of service (QoS) of the source-destination link. On the basis of the
rate R, the destination decides whether another copy of the data
signal is required or not. As previously mentioned, the retransmission
process is based on an ACK/NACK mechanism, in which short-
length error-free packets are broadcasted by the destination D over
a separate narrow-band channel, in order to inform the source and
the relay nodes of that reception QoS status. In the second time slot,
if necessary, i.e., if the rate of the source-destination channel falls
below R, the best relay processes the received signal using the DF
protocol [43, 44], whereby a copy of the original source message is
generated and transmitted again to the destination.
It is assumed that all wireless links in Fig. 1, including the E’s
channels, exhibit frequency flat Rayleigh block fading. This means
that the fading channel coefficients remain (approximately) static
for one coherence interval, but change independently in different
coherence intervals according to a zero-mean circularly symmetric
complex Gaussian distribution. We let hi,j denote the complex valued
channel coefficient characterizing the transmission from node i to
node j, where i, j ∈ {s, d, e, r1, ..., rM}. The receivers at nodes
S, D, E, and Rm are impaired by additive white Gaussian noise
(AWGN). Hence, the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) with respect to
(w.r.t.) link i-j follows an exponential distribution with mean denoted
as σ¯ij .
A. Direct transmission
In the following and for later reference, we proceed by presenting
the security analysis in the special case of direct transmission (i.e.,
without using relay cooperation) as a benchmark. Subsequently, in
Section III, we will propose the DF-based IR protocol to improve
the PHY layer security against eavesdropping attack, and extend our
analysis to this latter case.
In the direct transmission case (Fig. 2), source S transmits a se-
quence of complex valued digital symbols to destinationD, at the rate
R in units of bits per channel use. Here, we assume that quadrature
phase-shift keying (QPSK) is employed as the modulation technique,
and we let A with cardinality Q = |A| denote the normalized symbol
constellation. At a given time instant (i.e., channel use), S transmits
a scaled random symbol
√
Pss, where s ∈ A with E{|s|2} = 1
and Ps is the source transmit power. Due the broadcast nature of
electromagnetic waves, the radio signal transmitted by S to D will
also reach some unintended areas, resulting in information leakage.
Consequently, eavesdropper E may overhear the transmission of S
and reproduce the original confidential signal.
Meanwhile, the AN vector expressed by [
√
P1x1, . . . ,
√
PNxN ]
is emitted by node E, where N is the number of available transmit
antennas, xi for i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N} are random variables taken from a
complex circular Gaussian distribution with zero mean and variance
E{|xi|2} = 1, and Pi is the corresponding transmit power allocated
to the ith antenna. Ideally, the AN is generated to be in the null
space of node E’s receiving channel, and thus, does not affect E but
degrades the receivers’ channels [45]. Hence, the received signals at
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D and E are respectively given by
rs,d =
√
Pshs,ds+
N∑
i=1
√
Pici,dxi + ns,d, (1)
rs,e =
√
Pshs,es+ ns,e, (2)
where ci,d is the complex channel gain between the i
th antenna of
E and the destination D, while ns,d ∼ CN
(
0, σ2n
)
and ns,e ∼
CN (0, σ2n) are the additive noise terms at the destination and the
eavesdropper terminal respectively 2. Then, the channel capacity of
the direct S−D link and the achievable rate of the wiretap S−E link
are given by
Csd = log2 (1 + Ψsd) , Ψsd =
Ps|hs,d|2
N∑
i=1
Pi|ci,d|2 + σ2n
, (3)
Cse = log2 (1 + Ψse) , Ψse =
Ps|hs,e|2
σ2n
. (4)
According to [46], when the capacity of the wiretap S−E link
is lower than the data rate R, E will fail to decode the message
from S, while the legitimate S−D link remains secure. However,
if the capacity of the wiretap link becomes higher than the data
rate R, E may succeed in decoding S’s message and hence, an
intercept event occurs. Within this context, the intercept probability
(IP) defined below is a key metric in evaluating the performance of
PHY layer security:
PDTint = Pr (Cse > R) = exp
(
− δ
σ¯se
)
(5)
where δ = 2R − 1 and the superscript DT stands for direct
transmission. As expected, the IP is contingent on the transmit power
of source S and the quality of the wiretap S−E link, through the
parameter σ¯se, as well as the data rate R. Note that increasing the
data rate or decreasing the transmit power of the source, causes the
IP to decrease, which in turn improves the security of the network.
However, this comes at the cost of a deterioration in transmission
reliability, since the SOP of the legitimate link increases (see below)
when a higher data rate or lower transmit power is adopted at S.
Let us next investigate the achievable secrecy rate of direct trans-
mission, which is defined as the difference between the information
rate of the S−D link and that of the S−E link:
CDTsd = [Csd − Cse]+ = log2
(
1 +Ψsd
1 + Ψse
)
, (6)
where [x]+ = max [x, 0] 3. Under the security constraint, the
legitimate network is in outage whenever a transmitted message
cannot be received reliably. Specifically, for a given secure rate R,
a secrecy outage event occurs when the secrecy rate falls below the
thresholding R. In this regard, the secrecy outage probability (SOP)
provides another key metric in evaluating the performance of PHY
layer security. For the traditional direct transmission mode, the SOP
can be formulated as
PDTout =Pr
(
CDTsd ≤ R
)
= Pr
(
log2
(
1 + Ψsd
1 +Ψse
)
< R
)
=Pr
(
Ψsd ≤ 2RΨse + δ
)
. (7)
The CDF of RV Ψsd and pdf of RV Ψse at hand can be expressed
2For simplicity, we assume that these noise terms have the same power but
the analysis can be extended to the case of different noise powers.
3When the secrecy capacity is negative, a SOP event occurs.
as [19]
FΨsd (Ψsd) = 1−
N∑
i=1
πsd
κsd
Ψsd + κsd
exp
(
−Ψsd
σ¯sd
)
, (8)
fΨse (Ψse) =
1
σ¯se
exp
(
− 1
σ¯se
Ψse
)
, (9)
where κsd =
σ¯sd
σ¯id
4 and πsd =
N∏
i=1
j 6=i
σ¯id
σ¯id−σ¯jd
. Using these expressions,
the SOP of the conventional direct transmission is obtained as
PDTout =
∫ ∞
0
FΨsd
(
2RΨse + δ
)
fΨse (Ψse) dΨse
= 1−
N∑
i=1
σ¯−1se πsdκsd(δ + 1)
−1 exp
(
(δ + κsd)
σ¯se (δ + 1)
+
κsd
σ¯sd
)
× Γ
(
0,
(δ + κsd)
σ¯se (δ + 1)
+
(δ + κsd)
σ¯sd
)
. (10)
III. PROPOSED DF INCREMENTAL RELAYING SCHEME
In this section, the proposed relay selection scheme is exposed
and its secrecy performance analyzed. We here make use of the DF
scheme along with an IR protocol to augment the spectral efficiency
over fixed relaying systems. Based on the model description provided
in Section II, the received signal at Rm and subsequently received
signal at D and E from the selected relay, are respectively given by
rs,m =
√
Pshs,ms+
N∑
ℓ=1
√
Pℓcℓ,mxℓ + ns,m, (11)
rm,d =
√
Pmhm,ds+
N∑
i=1
√
Pici,dxi + nm,d, (12)
rm,e =
√
Pmhm,es+ nm,e, (13)
where Ps = P
′/2 and Pm = P
′/2 are the transmitted power at S
and R respectively and P ′ is the total power budget of the network. In
addition, cℓ,m is the complex channel gain between the ℓth antenna of
E and themth relay while ns,m ∼ CN
(
0, σ2n
)
, nm,d ∼ CN
(
0, σ2n
)
and nm,e ∼ CN
(
0, σ2n
)
are additive noise terms. There are two
possible cases for the data transmission depending on whether the
WIRS F is empty or not. For simplicity, let F = ∅ represents the
former case and F = Fn the latter.
• Case F = ∅: This case corresponds to a situation where all
the candidate relays fail in perfectly decoding the source signal.
From an information theoretic perspective, this condition can be
expressed based on (11) in the following form,
1
2
log2 (1 + Ψsm) < R, ∀m, (14)
where Ψsm =
Ps|hs,m|2
N∑
i=1
Pi|ci,m|2+σ2n
. Based on (14), the occurrence
probability of case F = ∅ is given by
Pr (F = ∅) =
M∏
m=1
Pr
(
1
2
log2 (1 + Ψsm) < R
)
=
M∏
m=1
Pr
(
Ψsm < 2
2R − 1
)
=
M∏
m=1
Eℓm, (15)
where Eℓm = 1 −
N∑
ℓ=1
πs
κs
̺+κs
exp
(
− ̺
σ¯sm
)
, ̺ = 22R − 1,
πs =
N∏
ℓ=1
q 6=ℓ
σ¯ℓm
σ¯ℓm−σ¯mq
and κs =
σ¯sm
σ¯ℓm
.
4|ci,j |
2, j ∈ {m,d} follows an exponential distribution with mean σ¯ij .
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• Case F = Fn: This case corresponds to all the relays in the
WIRS Fn being able to decode the source signal successfully,
i.e., the event F = Fn is formulated as
1
2
log2 (1 + Ψsm) > R if and only if m ∈ Fn (16)
From (16), the occurrence probability of case F = Fn can be
formulated as
Pr (F = Fn) =
∏
m∈Fn
Pr
(
1
2
log2 (1 + Ψsm) > R
)
×
∏
m∈F¯n
Pr
(
1
2
log2 (1 + Ψsm) < R
)
=
∏
m∈Fn
Pr (Ψsm > ̺)
∏
m∈F¯n
Pr (Ψsm < ̺)
=
∏
m∈Fn
Eℓm
∏
m∈F¯n
(1− Eℓm) . (17)
During the cooperative phase and according to the assumed secu-
rity protocol, when Fn is non-empty, the best relay is chosen from
Fn to forward its decoded signal toward the destination, allowing the
eavesdropper to intercept the transmission.
IV. SECURITY-RELIABILITY ANALYSIS OF IR SCHEMES
Based on the available knowledge of CSI for the different links
and system complexity, different relay selection schemes are pre-
sented and analyzed for the following three cases. For Case I,
corresponding to the situation when the CSI of the legitimate channels
(i.e. S − Rm, Rm − D) is available but not that of the Rm − E
channel, the conventional relay selection scheme is implemented.
The latter scheme does only take into account the capacity of the
legitimate channels, without considering the secrecy rate. In Case
II, i.e. when the CSI of the Rm − E link is known, minimum
relay selection scheme is applied. We note that for Cases I and II,
suboptimal relay selection is performed. Finally, in Case III, while
the same CSI assumption as in Case II are made, an optimal relay
selection scheme is implemented, whereby the relay that achieves
the maximum secrecy rate is chosen for retransmission. Compared
to conventional relay selection approaches [47–51] where only the
CSI of the legitimate S − Rm and Rm − D links are required, in
the optimal IR scheme, knowledge of the channel gain magnitudes
of eavesdroppers channels is also needed for maximizing the secrecy
rate through the use of an error-free feedback channel between E
and D [14, 16, 52, 53]). The assumption of known eavesdropper
CSI can be justified when the eavesdropper is seen as another
legitimate user waiting to be served by the source while the latter
is serving the destination securely. Thus, the eavesdropper has to
report its CSI to the source to be considered for future service. This
is applicable particularly in networks combining multicast and unicast
transmissions.
Without loss of generality, assuming that event F = Fn occurs and
relay “m” is selected as the “best one”, the corresponding Rm −D
and Rm − E channel capacities are
CDFmd =
1
2
log2 (1 + Ψmd) , (18)
CDFme =
1
2
log2 (1 + Ψme) , (19)
where Ψmd =
Pm|hm,d|2
N∑
i=1
Pi|ci,d|2+σ2n
, Ψme =
Pm|hm,e|2
σ2n
and the super-
script DF refers to decode-and-forward. For the case of unsuccessful
direct transmission, two time slots are required to transmit the data,
justifying the factor of 1/2 in (18)-(19). To boost the effective channel
gain and thereby enhance communication reliability, the destination
then employs either MRC or SC of all signals received in both
phases, and generates an estimation of the original signal after
maximum likelihood decoding (MLD). As such, two categories of
combining solutions do exist for both destination and eavesdropper
nodes, leading to various cases in our analysis as detailed below (see
also Table 1).
A. Suboptimal Selection Case I: DMC
Let us investigate the security and reliability performance of the DF
IR scheme where a combination of the conventional relay mode and
the MRC technique are applied. In this approach, the relay selection
scheme does not take into account the eavesdropper’s channels and
the relay node is selected based on the instantaneous quality of the
combined S −Rm and Rm −D link, with the aim to maximize the
achievable rate at the destination node. Specifically, the index of the
relay chosen to forward the legitimate signal from D to E is given
by
m∗ = argmax
m∈Fn
CDMsd , (20)
where we define CDMsd =
1
2
log2 (1 + Ψmd +Ψsd). Notice that for the
MRC technique, the instantaneous SNR is given by the sum of two
SNRs, i.e., Ψmd and Ψsd. Then, the secrecy rate is expressed as
CDMCsd =
[
CDMCd −CDMe
]+
=
1
2
log2

1+ maxm∈FnΨmd+Ψsd
1+Ψm∗e+Ψse

, (21)
where CDMCd = max
m∈Fn
CDMsd and C
DM
e =
1
2
log2 (1 + Ψme +Ψse).
We now derive an analytical expression for the IP for conventional
relaying with MRC. To this end, we first present the following general
expression for the IP, based on the law of total probability, that is
applicable to various combinations of signal combining and relay
selection schemes,
Pint = Pr (F = ∅)PDTint +
2M−1∑
n=1
Pr (F = Fn)PQint, (22)
where superscript Q ∈ {DSC,DSM,DMC,DMM,DMA,DSA}
refers to the applicable scheme and PQint = Pr
(
CQe > R
)
. In the
particular case of interest here, i.e. Q = DMC, the following closed-
form expression for the IP can be obtained,
PDMCint = Pr
(
1
2
log2 (1 + Ψm∗e +Ψse) > R
)
=1−Pr(Ψm∗e+Ψse<̺)=
5∑
l=1
r˜ (l)exp
(−t˜ (l) ̺), (23)
where r˜ = [1,−ρ, ρ, λ,−λ], t˜ =
[
0, 0, 1
σ¯me
, 0, 1
σ¯se
]
, ρ =
σ¯me
(σ¯me−σ¯se)
and λ = σ¯se
(σ¯me−σ¯se)
.
Next, we focus on the derivation of the SOP expression. For a DF
IR network using M relays, and based on the law of total probability,
the following general expression can be obtained for the SOP,
Pout = Pr (F = ∅)PDTout +
2M−1∑
n=1
Pr (F = Fn)PQ˜out, (24)
where Q˜ ∈ {DSC,DSM,DSO,DMC,DMM,DMO,DMA,DSA}
and PQ˜out = Pr
(
CQ˜sd < R
)
. Note that PDTout was derived in (10);
hence, we next proceed to obtain PDMCout . The following lemma and
theorem provide key results towards this end.
Lemma 1: The CDF of RV Y = max
m∈Fn
Ψmd + Ψsd can be
expressed in closed-form as
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FY (̺) =1−
N∑
i=1
πsd
σ¯idη
exp
(
− ̺
σ¯sd
)
−
|Fn|∑
m=1
N∑
i=1
(−1)m−1πsd
σ¯sdσ¯id
×
(
|Fn|
m
) exp
(
− m̺
σ¯md
)
η˜
(
1
σ¯id
+ m̺
σ¯md
)+exp
(
− ̺
σ¯sd
)
(ηη˜)

 , (25)
where η˜ =
(
1
σ¯sd
− m
σ¯md
)
and η = ̺
σ¯sd
+ 1
σ¯id
.
Proof: See Appendix I. 
The following theorem, whose proof relies on lemma 1, quantifies
the SOP for the DMC case.
Theorem 1: The SOP for the DMC scheme is given by
PDMCout = 1−
2∑
l=1
N∑
i=1
h (l) πsd
σ¯id (̺+ 1)

χσ¯sd −
|Fn|∑
m=1
(−1)m−1 ×
(
|Fn|
m
)[
χm−1σ¯md − χσ¯sd
]
(
1− mσ¯sd
σ¯md
)

 , (26)
where χσ¯sd = σ¯sd exp
(
− ̺
σ¯sd
)
Φ
(
1, 1; η + ησ¯sd
̺+1
g (l)
)
with
χm−1σ¯md obtained by using its subscript in place of σ¯sd in χσ¯sd ,
h =
[
1
σ¯me−σ¯se
,− 1
σ¯me−σ¯se
]
and g =
[
1
σ¯me
, 1
σ¯se
]
.
Proof: See Appendix II 
B. Suboptimal Selection Case I: DSC
In this subsection, we analyze the DF-based IR scheme in which
the destination and the eavesdropper node employ SC in order to
maximize their respective achievable rate. In this case, the relay that
gives the maximum capacity at the destination node is selected, i.e.,
m∗ =argmax
m∈Fn
CDFmd , (27)
where CDFmd is defined in (18). Then, the secrecy rate
for DSC is given by CDSCsd =
[
CDSCs − CDSe
]+
=
1
2
log2

 1+max
{
max
m∈Fn
Ψmd,Ψsd
}
1+max{Ψm∗e,Ψse}

, where CDSe =
max
{
1
2
log2 (1 + Ψme) ,
1
2
log2 (1 + Ψse)
}
, CDSCs = max
m∈Fn
CDSsd
and CDSsd = max
{
1
2
log2 (1 + Ψmd) ,
1
2
log2 (1 + Ψsd)
}
. Notice
that for the SC technique, the instantaneous SNR is given by the
maximum of the two SNRs as in CDSe and C
DS
sd . In the following,
we proceed to derive PDSCint , starting with
PDSCint = Pr (max {Ψse,Ψm∗e} > ̺) = 1− FΨm∗e(̺)FΨse(̺).
(28)
Making use of the CDFs of the RVs Ψse and Ψme, we obtain
PDSCint =
3∑
l=1
r (l) exp (−b (l) ̺) , (29)
wherer = [1, 1,−1] and b =
[
1
σ¯me
, 1
σ¯se
, 1
σ¯se
+ 1
σ¯me
]
.
Theorem 2: The SOP for the DSC scheme is given by
PDSCout =1−
3∑
l=1
|Fn|∑
m=1
N∑
i=1
a (l)πsd
σ¯id
(−1)m−1
(
|Fn|
m
)
×
[Im−1σ¯md − Iτ−1]−
3∑
l=1
N∑
i=1
a (l) πsd
σ¯id
Iσ¯sd , (30)
where Iσ¯sd = exp
(
− ̺
σ¯sd
)
σ¯sd
̺+1
Φ
(
1, 1; η + b (l) σ¯sdη
̺+1
)
, τ =(
m
σ¯md
+ 1
σ¯sd
)
and a =
[
1
σ¯me
, 1
σ¯se
,−
(
1
σ¯se
+ 1
σ¯me
)]
.
Proof: The proof follows the same steps as that of Theorem 1.

C. Suboptimal Selection Case II: DMM
We now investigate the use of MRC with the minimum selection
scheme (DMM) under Case II, where additional CSI information
about the Rm−E links is available. The objective is to select the
relay in Fn to minimize the achievable rate at the eavesdropper
node. This relay selection scheme considers only the Rm−E link
and furthermore, both the destination and eavesdropper nodes employ
MRC. In this case, the relay that yields the lowest instantaneous rate
at the eavesdropper will be selected, i.e.,
m∗ =argmin
m∈Fn
CDMMe . (31)
Consequently, the secrecy rate becomes CDMMsd =[
CDMsd − CDMMe
]+
= 1
2
log2
(
1+Ψm∗d+Ψsd
1+ min
m∈Fn
Ψme+Ψse
)
, where
CDMMe = min
m∈Fn
CDMe . The IP expression for this case can
be obtained as
PDMMint = Pr
(
1
2
log2
(
1 + min
m
Ψme +Ψse
)
> R
)
= 1− Pr
(
min
m
Ψme +Ψse < ̺
)
= 1−
2∑
l=1
h˜ (l)
g˜ (l)
[1− exp (−g˜ (l) ̺)], (32)
where g˜ (l) =
[
1
σ¯se
, |Fn|
σ¯me
]
and h˜ (l) =[
|Fn|
(|Fn|σ¯se−σ¯me)
,− |Fn|
(|Fn|σ¯se−σ¯me)
]
.
To proceed with the derivation of the SOP, we first need to obtain
a closed-form expression for the CDF of the RV Y˜ = Ψm∗d +Ψsd,
which is presented in the following lemma.
Lemma 2: The CDF of Y˜ is given by
FY˜ (γ) =1−
N∑
i=1
πsd
1 + σ¯id
σ¯sd
γ

exp(− γ
σ¯sd
)
+
exp
(
− γ
σ¯sd
)
σ¯sd
(
1
σ¯sd
− 1
σ¯md
)


−
exp
(
− γ
σ¯md
)
σ¯sd
(
1
σ¯sd
− 1
σ¯md
) N∑
i=1
πsd
σ¯id
1(
γ
σ¯md
+ 1
σ¯id
) . (33)
Proof: The proof of this lemma is analogous to that of Lemma 1.

We are now in a position to derive the desired SOP expression,
which is provided in the following theorem.
Theorem 3: The SOP for the DMM scheme is given by
PDMMout =1−
2∑
l=1
|Fn|∑
m=1
N∑
i=1
h˜(l)πsd [Tsd + ϑTmd − ϑTsd]
σ¯id (̺+ 1)
, (34)
where Tsd = σ¯sd exp
(
− ̺
σ¯sd
)
Φ
(
1, 1; η + g˜(l)ησ¯sd
̺+1
)
and ϑ =(
1− σ¯sd
σ¯md
)
. Proof: See Appendix III. 
D. Suboptimal Selection Case II: DSM
For this case, the relay is chosen according to the following rule,
m∗ =argmin
m∈Fn
CDSe , (35)
while the secrecy rate is given by CDSMsd =
[
CDSsd − CDSMe
]+
=
1
2
log2

 1+max{Ψm∗d,Ψsd}
1+max
{
min
m∈Fn
Ψme,Ψse
}

, where CDSMe = min
m∈Fn
CDSe .
Herein we define the variable u = min
m∈Fn
Ψme with CDF FU (γ) =
1 − exp
(
− |Fn|γ
σ¯me
)
, in terms of which the intercept probability for
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the DSM case can be expressed as
PDSMint = Pr
(
1
2
log2 (1 + max {u,Ψse}) > R
)
=1−Fu(̺)FΨse(̺)=
3∑
l=1
r (l) exp
(
−b˜ (l)w
)
, (36)
where b˜ =
[
|Fn|
σ¯me
, 1
σ¯se
,
(
1
σ¯se
+ |Fn|
σ¯me
)]
.
Besides, the SOP can be obtained in closed-form as given in the
following theorem.
Theorem 4: The SOP for the DSM scheme is given by
PDSMout =1−
3∑
l=1
|Fn|∑
m=1
N∑
i=1
a˜ (l) πsd [Jσ¯md+Jσ¯sd−Jτ˜−1 ]
σ¯id(̺+ 1)
, (37)
where Jσ¯md = σ¯md exp
(
− ̺
σ¯md
)
Φ
(
1, 1;µ+ µσ¯md
(̺+1)
b˜ (l)
)
, a˜ =[
|Fn|
σ¯me
, 1
σ¯se
,−
(
1
σ¯se
+ |Fn|
σ¯me
)]
and τ˜ =
(
1
σ¯md
+ 1
σ¯sd
)
.
Proof: The proof is similar to that of Theorem 3. 
E. Optimal Selection Case III: DSO
The two previously considered relay selection schemes do not
simultaneously involve the relay to destination and relay to eaves-
dropper channels. In contrast, the optimal relay selection scheme
takes into account CSI information for both the mentioned links.
This subsection presents the DSO scheme where the relay selected
for forwarding the source signal to the destination is the one achieving
the maximum secrecy capacity, which by definition takes into account
the quality of both links. Specifically, the desired relay is chosen as
m∗ =argmax
m∈Fn
Cbm, (38)
where Cbm =
1
2
log2
(
1+Ψmd
1+Ψme
)
. The secrecy rate for this case is given
by [39]
CDSOsd = max
{
Ca, max
m∈Fn
Cbm
}
. (39)
where Ca = 1
2
log2
(
1+Ψsd
1+Ψse
)
. We notice that the derivation of
the SOP in this case is quite challenging and it does not seem
possible to obtain a closed-form expression. Therefore, we rely on
the approximation of the SOP at high SNR in our study, as further
developed in Section V.
F. Optimal Selection Case III: DMO
In the case of DMO, the proposed selection technique selects the
optimal relay as in (38), and the secrecy rate will be
CDMOsd =
1
2
log2
(
22C
a
+ max
m∈Fn
22C
b
m
)
. (40)
Likewise the DSO case, obtaining a closed-form expression for
the SOP in the DMO case is intractable. However, a closed form
expression for the SOP in the high SNR regime will be obtained
in Section V. Nevertheless, numerical SOP results for the DSO and
DMO cases can be obtained through computer simulations.
G. Suboptimal Selection: DSA
Thus far, emphasis has been placed on the cases in which only the
best relay was employed in the cooperation phase. The DSA scheme
considers the case where several relays (i.e. more than 1) can assist
in forwarding confidential information from S to D. To be specific,
all the relays in the WIRS re-encode the information and forward
this re-encoded message to the destination (and eavesdropper). This
subsection assumes that both the destination and the eavesdropper
use SC technique. Hence, the secrecy rate is defined as
CDSAsd =
[
CDSAmd −CDSAme
]+
=
1
2
log
(
1+max
{
ΨDSAmd ,Ψsd
}
1+max{ΨDSAme ,Ψse}
)
, (41)
where P ′m = P
′/ (|Fn|+ 1), ΨDSAmd =
max
m∈Fn
P ′m|hmd|
2
N∑
i=1
Pi|cid|
2+σ2n
and
ΨDSAme = max
m∈Fn
P ′m|hm,e|2
σ2n
.
With the assumption that both the destination and the eavesdropper
node employ SC, the IP of the DSA scheme can be formulated as
PDSAint =
|Fn|∑
m=1
(−1)m−1
σ¯seωˆ
(
|Fn|
m
)[
exp
(
− m̺
σ¯me
)
−exp
(
− ̺
σ¯se
−ωˆ̺
)]
.
(42)
where ωˆ =
(
1
σ¯se
− m
σ¯me
)
. We next develop a closed-form expression
of the secrecy outage performance for the DSA scheme. To begin,
we first introduce the following key result.
Lemma 3: Let the denominator of the log function in (41) be 1+γ1.
Then, the pdf of γ1 is derived as
fγ1 (γ) =
|Fn|∑
m1=1
4∑
l=1
(−1)m1−1
( |Fn|
m1
)
c˜ (l) exp (−c (l) γ)
(43)
where c˜ =
[
m1
σ¯me
,− m1
σ¯me
,− 1
σ¯se
, 1
σ¯se
]
, c =
[
m1
σ¯me
, ˆ̟ , ˆ̟ , 1
σ¯se
]
and
ˆ̟ =
(
m1
σ¯me
+ 1
σ¯se
)
.
Proof: The CDF of ΨDSAme and Ψse is obtained respectively
as FΨDSAme (γ) = 1 −
|Fn|∑
m=1
(−1)m−1
( |Fn|
m
)
exp
(
− mγ
σ¯me
)
and
FΨse (γ) =
[
1− exp
(
− γ
σ¯se
)]
. Then, by taking the derivative of
fγ1 (γ) =
d
dγ
[
FΨDSA
mE
(γ)× FΨse (γ)
]
we obtain (43).

Lemma 3 allows us to obtain a closed-form expression for the
secrecy rate of the DSA scheme as stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 5: The SOP for the DSA scheme is given by
PDSAout = 1−

Iσ¯sd +
|Fn|∑
m=1
(−1)m−1
( |Fn|
m
)[
Iσ¯mdm−1 − Iτ−1
] ,
(44)
where
Iσ¯sd =
N∑
i=1
|Fn|∑
m1=1
4∑
l=1
πid
σ¯id
(−1)m1−1c˜ (l)
(
22R
σ¯sd
)−1 ( |Fn|
m1
)
×
exp
(
− ̺
σ¯sd
)
Φ
(
1, 1; c (l) η
σ¯sd
22R
+ η
)
, (45)
and η =
(
1
σ¯id
+ ̺
σ¯sd
)
.
Proof: Let the numerator of the log function in (41) be 1 + γ2.
Using the PDF of RV γ1 as in (43) as well as the CDF of RV Y in
(25), we express the secrecy rate of the DSA scheme as
PDSAout = Eγ1
[
Pr
(
γ2 < 2
2Rγ1 + ̺
)]
(46)
=
∫ ∞
0
Fγ2
(
22Rγ1 + ̺
)
fγ1 (γ1) dγ1. (47)
The desired result is obtained by substituting (43) into (47) and
evaluating the resulting integral. 
H. Suboptimal Selection: DMA
This scheme is analogous to the DSA one except that the destina-
tion and the eavesdropper both employ the MRC technique. In this
case, the secrecy rate is
CDMAsd =
[
CDMAmd − CDMAme
]+
=
1
2
log
(
1 + ΨDMAmd
1 + ΨDMAme
)
, (48)
where ΨDMAmd =
∑
m∈Fn
P ′m|hmd|
2
N∑
i=1
Pid|cid|
2+σ2n
+ Ψsd and Ψ
DMA
me =
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∑
m∈Fn
P ′m|hm,E|2
σ2n
+Ψse.
In the following, we analyze the IP of the DMA case in which all
relays that can successfully decode the source’s message simultane-
ously forward its replicated image to the destination. For this DMA
case, the IP is defined as
PDMAint = Pr
(
1
2
log2
(
1 + ΨDMAme
)
> R
)
. (49)
The latter can be expressed in closed form as
PDMAint =
|Fn|−1∑
k=0
k∑
t=0
̺k−t(−1)t
(σ¯me)
kσ¯sek!
(
k
t
)
×
[
t!
ζt+1
− exp (−̺ζ)
t∑
i=0
t!̺i
i!ζt−i+1
]
, (50)
where ζ =
(
1
σ¯se
− 1
σ¯me
)
.
Next, we proceed to obtain the SOP of the DMA scheme which
can be expressed as
Pr
(
CDMAsd <R
)
=EΨDMAme
[
FΨDMA
md
(
̺+ (̺+ 1)ΨDMAme
)]
. (51)
In order to proceed with the evaluation of (51), we first need to
obtain a closed-from expression for the CDF of ΨDMAmd , which is
provided in the following lemma.
Lemma 4: The CDF of ΨDMAmd is derived as
FΨDMA
md
(̺)=1−
|Fn|∑
m=1
m−1∑
k=0
k∑
l=0
N∑
i=1
υmπsdσ¯
m−k
md ̺
kΓ (l+1)
σ¯idΓ (k + 1)
×
(
k
l
)
exp
(
− ̺
σ¯md
)
Ξl+1
−
N∑
i=1
ωσ¯sdπsd
σ¯idη
exp
(
− ̺
σ¯sd
)
, (52)
where Ξ =
(
̺
σ¯md
+ 1
σ¯id
)
, ω = 1
σ¯sdσ¯
|Fn|
md
1(
1
σ¯md
− 1
σ¯sd
)|Fn| and
υm =
(−1)|Fn|−m
σ¯sdσ¯
|Fn|
md
1(
1
σ¯sd
− 1
σ¯md
)|Fn|−m+1 .
Proof: See Appendix IV 
Now, with the help of Lemma 4, the final SOP expression for the
DMA case can be obtained, as stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 6: The SOP for the DMA scheme is given by (53) shown
on the top of the next page, where q′ = 1
σ¯seσ¯
|Fn|
me
1(
1
σ¯me
− 1
σ¯se
)|Fn|
and ξ′q =
(−1)|Fn|−m
σ¯seσ¯
|Fn|
me
1(
1
σ¯se
− 1
σ¯me
)|Fn|−m+1 .
Proof: See Appendix V 
V. DIVERSITY ORDER ANALYSIS
In this section, to characterize the impact of key parameters on the
secrecy outage performance, the asymptotic SOP in the high SNR
regime is investigated. To simplify the developments, we let σ¯sd =
εσ¯md and σ¯sm = εˆσ¯md, where ε and εˆ are positive numbers close
to 1, which means that the channel quality of the legitimate links
is comparable (of the same order). We also let σ¯se = ε˜σ¯me with ε˜
close to 1, meaning that the channel quality of the wiretap links is
similar. We first consider the case σ¯sd →∞, which corresponds to a
scenario where S is located much closer to D than E. Subsequently,
we also consider the limiting case where σ¯se → ∞, for which the
intercept probability goes to 1. Below, we first derive SOP expressions
in the asymptotic regime for each one of the following relay selection
schemes: DSA, DSM, DSC, DMA, DMC, DMM, DSO and DMO.
Using these formulas, we then derive corresponding expressions of
the coding gain and diversity.
A. Analysis
Direct Transmission: Using the following Maclaurin series ex = 1+
x+ o(x2) and (1− x)−1 = 1 + x+ o(x2), the asymptotic CDF of
RV Ψsd can be obtained as (54).
FΨsd (Ψsd) =
N∑
i=1
πsd (1 + σ¯id) (σ¯sd)
−1Ψsd + o
(
σ¯−1sd
)
. (54)
In turn, making use the above CDF, the following expression is
obtained for the SOP in the asymptotic regime,
P∞,DTout =
[
N∑
i=1
πsd2
Rσ¯se (1 + σ¯id)
]
(σ¯sd)
−1. (55)
DMC: We first note that in the asymptotic regime of high SNR, the
probability of a WIRS event simplifies as follows,
Pr (F = ∅) =
M∏
m=1
Uℓmσ¯−Msd ,and Pr (F = Fn) =
∏
m∈F¯n
Uℓmσ¯|Fn|−Msd ,
(56)
where Uℓm =
N∑
ℓ=1
πsℓmεˆ (σ¯ℓm + 1) ̺. Then, making use of (54) and
(56) along with appropriate power series expansion, the asymptotic
SOP of the DMC scheme is obtained as
P∞,DMCout = ε|Fn|22R(|Fn|+1)
N∑
i=1
|Fn|+1∑
m=0
2∑
l=1
(
|Fn|+ 1
m
)
×
g(l)−(|Fn|+2)h (l)πsdσ¯
m
idΓ(|Fn|+ 1)m!(σ¯sd)−(|Fn|+1). (57)
By proceeding in a similar manner, we can obtain the SOP
expressions of the other schemes, which are presented below
DSC:
P∞,DSCout =ε|Fn|22R(|Fn|+1)
|Fn|+1∑
m=0
N∑
i=1
3∑
l=1
(
|Fn|+ 1
m
)
a (l)×
b
−(|Fn|+2) (l)πsdm!σ¯
m
idΓ (|Fn|+ 2) (σ¯sd)−(|Fn|+1). (58)
DMM:
P∞,DMMout =
N∑
i=1
2∑
m=0
2∑
l=1
(
2
m
)
επsdh˜σ¯
m
id
2−4Rg˜3
Γ(m+1)(σ¯sd)
−2. (59)
DSM:
P∞,DSMout =
N∑
i=1
2∑
m=0
3∑
l=1
(
2
m
)
εa˜ (l)πsdσ¯
m
idΓ(m+1)
2−4R−1b˜3 (l)
(σ¯sd)
−2. (60)
DMA: Shown on the top of the next page.
DSA: Shown on the top of the next page.
DMO:
P∞,DMOout =
(ε
ε˜
)|Fn|
σ¯|Fn|+1se
22R(|Fn|+2)
(|Fn|+ 1) (|Fn|+ 2)×
|Fn|∑
m=0
N∑
i=1
πsdσ¯
m
id
(
|Fn|
m
)
(m! + σ¯id (m+ 1)!) σ¯
−(|Fn|+1)
sd . (63)
DSO:
P∞,DSOout =
(ε
ε˜
)|Fn|
σ¯|Fn|+1se 2
2R(|Fn|+2)
|Fn|∑
m=0
N∑
i=1
πsdσ¯
m+1
id ×(
|Fn|
m
)
(m! + σ¯id (m+ 1)!) σ¯
−(|Fn|+1)
sd . (64)
B. Diversity Order and Coding Gain
In the high SNR regime for the legitimate links, the coding gain
and diversity order are defined through the obtained asymptotic
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Pr
(
CDMAsd < R
)
=1−
N∑
i=1
ωσ¯2
sd
πsd
σ¯id (̺+ 1)
exp
(
−
̺
σ¯sd
)
×

q′ϕ(1, 1;α(1 + σ¯sd
σ¯se (̺+ 1)
))
+
|Fn|∑
q=1
ξ′q
(
ασ¯sd
̺+ 1
)q−1
Φ
(
q, q;α′
(
1 +
σ¯sd
σ¯me (̺+ 1)
))
−
|Fn|∑
m=1
i−1∑
k=0
k∑
L=0
N∑
i=1
k∑
p=0
υmπsdσ¯
L+m−k+1
md
q′̺k−pΓ (L+ 1)
σ¯id(̺+ 1)
L−p+1Γ (k + 1)
(
k
p
)(
k
L
)
exp
(
−
̺
σ¯md
)
×
[
Γ (p+ 1)
(
βσ¯md
̺+ 1
)p−L
Φ
(
p+ 1, p − L+ 1; β
(
1 +
σ¯md
σ¯se (̺+ 1)
))
+
|Fn|∑
q=1
ξ′qΓ (p+ q)
Γ (q)
(
σ¯mdβ
̺+ 1
)p+q−L−1
Φ
(
p+ q, p+ q − L;β
(
1 +
σ¯md
σ¯me (̺+ 1)
)) . (53)
P∞,DMAout =ε
|Fn|
22R(|Fn|+1)
Γ (|Fn|+ 2)
N∑
i=1
|Fn|+1∑
m=0
πsdσ¯
m
idΓ (m+ 1)
(|Fn|+ 1
m
)
×

q′Γ (|Fn|+ 2) σ¯|Fn|+1se + |Fn|∑
k=1
ξ′kΓ (|Fn|+ k + 1)
Γ (k)
σ¯
|Fn|+k+1
me

 (σ¯sd)−(|Fn|+1). (61)
P∞,DSAout =ε
|Fn|22R(|Fn|+1)
N∑
i=1
|Fn|+1∑
m=0
|Fn|∑
m1=1
(−1)m1−1
m1πsdσ¯
m
id
Γ (m+ 1)Γ (|Fn|+ 2) ξ
σ¯meσ¯se
×
(|Fn|
m1
)(|Fn|+ 1
m
)
×
[(
σ¯me
m1
)|Fn|+2
− σ¯
|Fn|+2
se
]
(σ¯sd)
−(|Fn|+1). (62)
TABLE II
DIVERSITY ORDER IN HIGH SNR REGIME
Scheme Diversity order
DT 1
DMC M + 1
DSC M + 1
DMM M − |Fn|+ 2
DSM M − |Fn|+ 2
DMO M + 1
DSO M + 1
DMA M + 1
DSA M + 1
expression for the SOP, that is: P∞,Qout ≈ (Cσ¯sd)−D , where C and
D respectively denote the coding gain and the diversity order of the
scheme Q under consideration. For example, in the case of DT , we
immediately obtain from (55) that
C =
[
N∑
i=1
πsd2
Rσ¯se (1 + σ¯id)
]−1
, D = 1. (65)
Proceeding in this manner, we can obtain the coding gain and
diversity order for each one of the schemes considered in Subsection
A. For reference, the diversity orders of these schemes are listed in
Table II, while the coding gain can easily be computed as
CQ =
(
P∞,Qout
)− 1
DQ
σ¯sd
, (66)
with the corresponding expression for P∞,Qout calculated previously.
Based on the above results, the diversity order of the schemes are
summarized in Table II.
C. Remarks
• The maximum diversity order of M + 1 is achieved for the
DMC, DSC, DMA, DSA, DMO and DSO schemes. In contrast,
the DMM and DSM scheme achieve a (conditional) diversity
order of M − |Fn|+2, which decreases with the cardinality of
the WIRS. Finally, the worst performing scheme is DT with a
diversity order of = 1.
• Since the diversity orders of DMC, DSC, DMA, DSA, DMO,
and DSO are identical, the tradeoff among these schemes is
solely characterized by their respective coding gains. Hence,
their relative performance can be quantified in terms of the
simple ratio of their coding gains, which can be interpreted as
an SNR gap. For example, the SNR gap between the DMC and
DSC schemes is given by
∆C =
CDMC
CDSC
. (67)
Here CDMC > CDSC and so ∆C > 1, indicating that DMC
outperforms DSC by 20 log10∆C for the same SOP. We can
show that the relative performance of the above schemes can
be ordered as CDMO > CDSO > CDMC > CDSC > CDMA >
CDSA.
• It is observed that when Fn = ∅, i.e., no relay can decode the
source symbol successfully, the exact SOP for all scenarios is
reduced to
Pout =
[
N∑
i=1
πsd2
Rσ¯se (1 + σ¯id)
]
(σ¯sd)
−1. (68)
In the special case when both σsd and σse → ∞ at the same
rate, the above expression results in a constant SOP; in turn, this
floor phenomenon leads to a zero diversity gain.
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Fig. 3. The secrecy outage performance of proposed relay selection schemes
and direct transmission versus SNR ( M = 4 and N = 5).
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we present numerical results to validate the derived
theoretical expressions of the SOP for the proposed methods. In
the simulations, the noise variances are all normalized to unity, the
data rate R = 0.5 bits per channel use. The simulation results are
obtained by averaging over 105 independent runs, and the number
of transmitted bits is set to 104 for each run. The relative SNRs of
the various links are characterized by the following parameter values:
ε = 1.01, ε˜ = 0.9 and εˆ = 1.03. The default values of the parameters
M and N , i.e. number of relays and eavesdropper antennas, are set
to 4 and 5, respectively, unless otherwise specified.
Fig. 3, shows the SOP comparison among the DT, DMC, DSM,
DMM, DMA, DSO, DMO, DSC and DSA, by plotting Eqs. (10),
(26), (30), (34), (37), (39), (40), (44) and (53), respectively, as
function of SNR. From the various curves in Fig. 3, it is seen that the
DMC, DSM, DMM, DMA, DSO, DMO, DSC and DSA schemes (in
the low to medium SNR range) all perform better than DT in terms of
secrecy performance, demonstrating the security benefits of exploiting
cooperative relays to defend against eavesdropping attack. One can
also see from Fig. 3 that the SOP performance of the DMO and DSO
schemes is better than that of the other schemes, thereby showing
the advantage of the optimal relay selection over the other selection
schemes and multiple relay selection, as well as the traditional DT.
The figure also includes a special curve for the case where the number
of transmit antennas of the eavesdropper node N = 0 corresponding
to the case where E does not send any AN to the legitimate network.
From the simulation results, we see that the error floor phenomenon
occurs in the absence of AN. This observation confirms that the
presence of AN can highly affect the secrecy outage performance of
the legitimate network. As can be observed, the analytical results are
in perfect agreement with the simulation results, which demonstrates
the validity of the derived analytical expressions. We also find that the
high SNR approximations are quite accurate (although the asymptotic
result is only plotted for DMA in order not to cause confusion in the
figure).
Fig. 4 shows numerical SOP results versus IP for both the
conventional DT and the proposed single and multi-relay selection
schemes, where the legitimate-to-eavesdropper channel gain ratio is
around 11 dB. One can see from Fig. 4 that for a specific IP value,
the SOP of the proposed relay selection schemes is strictly lower
than that of DT, thereby confirming that the former outperform the
conventional DT. It can be observed that the DSC and DMC schemes
outperform the DSA approach ( i.e., when all successful relays in the
WIRS are involved in transmission). This can be explained by noting
that in the DSA case, the eavesdropper receives multiple copies of the
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Fig. 4. The secrecy outage performance of proposed relay selection schemes
and direct transmission as a function of intercept probability ( M = 4 and
N = 5).
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Fig. 5. The secrecy outage performance of proposed relay selection schemes
and direct transmission as a function of the number of relays M (SNR =
10dB,N = 5).
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Fig. 6. The secrecy outage performance of proposed relay selection versus
the the number of eavesdropper N (M=4, SNR=30dB).
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security 11
source signal when multiple relays transmit, which in turn degrades
the secrecy performance.
Fig. 5 shows the SOP as a function of the number for relays M
of the DMC, DSM, DSA, DMM, DMA, and DSC schemes. It is
observed from Fig. 5 that the DMC scheme performs better than the
other single and multi-relay selection schemes in terms of SOP, except
the DSO and DMO. Again the proposed optimal relay selection
schemes, DSO and DMO, outperform the other schemes. Since even
with a small increase in M the SOP of DMO and DSO rapidly tends
to zero, the corresponding curves are not sketched here. One can also
see from Fig. 5 that as the number of relays M increases, the SOP of
the various schemes rapidly decreases, except for the DSA, DSM and
DMM schemes. In the case of DSA, this can be explained by noting
that for a fair comparison, the total amount of transmit power at the
source and relay shall be limited to P
′
= 2Pm = 2Ps. However,
using the equal-power allocation for simplicity, the transmit power
at the source and relay is given by Pm = Ps. Thus, in DSA where
all the relays in the WIRS cooperate in the next phase, the power
of each relay is reduced to P
′
/ (|Fn|+ 1) which negatively affects
the secrecy performance. The same line of thoughts can be applied
for DMA; however, in this case with an increasing number of relays,
the secrecy performance improves. In addition, as shown in Fig. 5,
the SOP improvement of DSC and DMC becomes more significant
as M increases.
Fig. 6 examines the impact of the number N of eavesdropper’s
transmit antennas on the secrecy outage performance when M = 4,
SNR = 30dB and the legitimate-to-eavesdropper channel gain ratio
is around −3 dB. The results clearly demonstrate that wireless
security degrade with an increase in the number N of antennas. Fur-
thermore, for both MRC and SC combining solutions, the proposed
optimal relay selection outperforms the other relay selection schemes
as well as the DT in terms of SOP. In other words, the DMO and
DSO schemes achieves the best SOP performance, further confirming
the advantage of the proposed optimal relay selection. That is, no
matter which combining solution (i.e., MRC and SC) is considered,
the proposed optimal relay selection always performs better than the
traditional relay selection and multiple relay combining approaches
in terms of secrecy performance. We see that at the low SNRs, both
MRC and SC combining solutions achieve similar results, while at
the high SNRs, the MRC scheme outperforms the SC scheme.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have studied the PHY-layer security in a cooperative wireless
subnetwork that includes a source-destination pair, multiple relays,
and a malevolent active eavesdropper, which can transmits AN with
a multiple-antenna transmitter to degrade the achievable secrecy rate
of the legitimate channels. Depending on the availability of the CSI,
we considered different relay selection schemes, i.e. conventional,
minimum and optimal selection, along with different combining
methods at the destination and eavesdropper, i.e. MRC and SC. We
first analyzed the secrecy capacity of the direct transmission in terms
of IP and SOP. A DF incremental relaying (IR) protocol was then
introduced to improve reliability and security of communications in
the presence of the eavesdropper. For each one of the proposed relay
selection schemes, and for both MRC and SC, we derived new and
exact closed-form expressions for the IP and SOP under the Rayleigh
channel assumption. We also characterized the secrecy performance
of the various relay schemes in the asymptotic high SNR regime,
which enabled us to obtain the associated coding gains and diversity
orders. For both signal combining solutions, the proposed IR schemes
(except DMM and DSC) achieve the maximum diversity order of
M+1, whereM is the number of relays. Our analysis and simulation
results have revealed that the IR-based relaying with optimal selection
outperforms the conventional selection, which in turns outperforms
minimum selection. Our results also indicate that as M increases,
the secrecy performance of the DMO, DSO, DMC, DSC and DMA
schemes improves rapidly.
APPENDIX I
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Let us introduce the following intermediate random variables (RV):
Y = max
m∈Fn
Ψmd +Ψsd, γid =
Pid|ci,d|2
σ2n
, γD =
N∑
i=1
γid and X =
max
m∈Fn
Ψmd. The existence of the common RV γD in X and Y leads
to a statistical dependence between RVs X and Y . By conditioning
on γD, we first obtain
FY (γ) = EγD [Pr (X + V ≤ γ (γD + 1) |γD )] (69)
= EγD [EV [FX (γ (γD + 1)− V ) |V ] |γD ] . (70)
Using of the binomial theorem, we obtain the CDF of X and the
PDF of γD as
FX(γ) = 1−
|Fn|∑
m=1
(−1)m−1
(
|Fn|
m
)
exp(− mγ
σ¯md
),
fγD (γ) =
N∑
i=1
πsd
σ¯id
exp
(
− γ
σ¯id
)
. (71)
Then, with the help of (2), (70) and (71), and using properties of
conditional expectations [54], we finally arrive at the expression of
FY (γ) in (25).
APPENDIX II
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Introducing Z = Ψme +Ψse and according to the definition of
SOP, we have
PDMCout =Pr (Y < ̺+(̺+1)Z) = EZ [FY (̺+ (̺+ 1)Z)]
= Pr
(
CDMCsd < R|Y > Z
)
Pr (Y > Z)
+ Pr
(
CDMCsd < R|Y < Z
)
Pr (Y < Z) . (72)
It is straightforward to verify that Pr
(
CDMCsd < R|Y < Z
)
= 1.
Then, the first term in (72) can be expressed as
Pr
(
CDMCsd <R|Y >Z
)
Pr (Y >Z)=
Pr
(
CDMCsd < R, Y >Z
)
Pr (Y >Z)
×
Pr (Y > Z) = Pr
(
Z < Y < 22RZ + ̺
)
= Pr
(
Y < 22RZ + ̺
)
− Pr (Z < Y ) . (73)
Making use of (73) and (72) we can write
PDMCout =Pr (Y <̺+(̺+1)Z)=EZ [FY (̺+(̺+1)Z)] . (74)
To prove the desired result, we call upon (74) and exploit the pdf of
the RV Z as
fZ(γ) =
2∑
l=1
h (l) exp (−g (l) γ). (75)
Then, according to (74), (75) and conjuring the identity [55, Eq.
(2.1.3.1)] we arrive at PDMCout as in (26).
APPENDIX III
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
The desired SOP can be first expressed in terms of the CDF of
RV Y˜
PDMMout =Pr
(
Y˜ <̺+(̺+1)Z˜
)
=EZ˜
[
FY˜
(
̺+(̺+1) Z˜
)]
. (76)
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where Z˜ = min
m∈Fn
Ψme +Ψse with its PDF given by
fZ˜(z) =
2∑
l=1
h˜ (l) exp (−g˜ (l) z). (77)
Then, making use of (33), (76), and (77) along with the identity [55,
Eq. (2.1.3.1)], we finally obtain (34).
APPENDIX IV
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
Introducing the ∆ =
∑
m∈Fn
γmd, γmd = Pm|hmd|2, γd =
N∑
i=1
γid
and γid =
Pid|cid|
2
σ2n
we have
FΨDMA
md
(̺) = Eγd [Pr (∆ < ̺γd + ̺ |γd )] . (78)
Making use of the moment generating function (MGF) of RVs ∆,
F∆ (x) and fγd (γd) can be obtained as
F∆ (x) = 1−
|Fn|−1∑
k=0
(
x
σ¯md
)k exp(− 1
σ¯md
x
)
k!
,
fγd(γd) =
N∑
i=1
πsd
σ¯id
exp
(
− γd
σ¯id
)
. (79)
Then, according to (79) we have
FΨDMA
md
(̺) = Eγd [F∆ (̺γd + ̺)] = 1−
∫ ∞
0
|Fn|−1∑
k=0
N∑
i=1
πsd
σ¯id
×
(γd + 1)
k
(
̺
σ¯md
)k
exp
(
−γd
(
̺
σ¯md
+ 1
σ¯id
)
− ̺
σ¯md
)
k!
dγd. (80)
Finally, the desired result is obtained by evaluating the above integral.
APPENDIX V
PROOF OF THEOREM 6
We first use the MGF to compute the PDF of the RV ΨDMAme as
fΨDMAme (γ)=q
′exp
(
− γ
σ¯se
)
+
|Fn|∑
q=1
ξ′qγ
q−1
Γ (q)
exp
(
− γ
σ¯me
)
. (81)
Then, based on (52), (51) and (81), we can obtain the following
integral expression,
Pr
(
CDMAsd <R
)
=
∫ ∞
0
FΨDMA
md
(̺+(̺+1)γ)fΨDMAme (γ) dγ. (82)
Finally, by invoking the binomial theorem as well as the identity [55,
Eq. (2.1.3.1)], we arrive at (53).
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